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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002129

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRADTKE

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TAGS: [UK](#) [IZ](#) [NL](#) [OSCE](#) [KINL](#)

SUBJECT: OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC COVER

REF: A. SECSTATE 240159

[B](#). THE HAGUE 2096

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel Reason 1.5 (d)

[1](#)1. Dutch OSCE coordinator Dan Everts briefed DCM on the outcome of his late August 22 meeting with FM de Hoop Scheffer on reftel demarche. Everts said that while the FM - like Everts - supported the idea of OSCE assistance to police training in Iraq, he could not simply decide to send an assessment mission on his own authority (or at the request of a member state). Everts said that the FM shared the view that other key members (e.g., the Russians, Germans, French and Italians) needed to be brought on board first or the initiative would go nowhere. The proposal to send a mission out of area to Iraq would be controversial; to act without getting support in key capitals would guarantee resistance in an organization that operates only by consensus.

[1](#)2. DCM responded that there was a precedent for OSCE out-of-area operations in Afghanistan and insisted that the spadework was already underway in Vienna. We would no doubt work capitals as well. An assessment team could bring back the information needed to frame the issue for decision within the OSCE. Events repeated that the issue was not any lack of willingness on the Dutch part - the FM saw the value of the mission. It was simply not something that the CIO could do on his own hook without causing other members to dig in their heels. Even Afghanistan, which "had not been easy and is not really going anywhere", was an OSCE partner for cooperation.

[1](#)3. Everts said that the CIO judged that the best prospect for getting to "Yes" in the OSCE would be if the UN Security Council provided a mandate. A request from the UNSC would moot the question of why the OSCE would get involved beyond the borders of even a partner country. Pressed further by DCM, Everts suggested that, if not the UNSC, perhaps a call by the G-8 would be sufficient to provide the kind of multilateral "blessing" needed to launch this effort, and would make it an easier sell by signaling all OSCE members that the key countries were already on board.
SOBEL